constitute Chiang Kai-shek's grand diplomatic strategy. This strategy was aimed both at persuading the world powers (especially the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) to render support to the Chinese resistance and at gaining prestige and stature for the Nationalist regime that would eventually (as Chiang staunchly believed) emerge victorious against Japan.
Iechika's study complements recent English-language scholarship that reevaluates, and in some sense rehabilitates, the contribution of the Nationalists to the defeat of the Japanese Empire and the liberation of China, most notably Jay Taylor 
Sharing with Taylor a fundamental critique of this Communist characterization of
Chiang Kai-shek, Iechika makes use of the Guomindang archival materials (some of which have recently been digitized for online use by Academia Historica), Chiang's diary, and a massive amount of published and unpublished sources collected in Japan to sculpt a complex and intriguing profile of the Generalissimo. Iechika's Chiang emerges as an aggressive and clever-if often arrogant and self-satisfied-strategist, simultaneously pursuing a platter of war plans, diplomatic policies, and long-term projects of nation-building. She argues that Chiang, more than any other wartime Chinese leader, including Mao Zedong, saw the Second Sino-Japanese War as a global conflict fought on several levels of engagement-not just on the ground, among foot soldiers, but also in terms of securing networks for transporting material resources and transmitting information, and even in the realm of domestic and international public discourse (2-8).
In the early chapters, Iechika explores the Generalissimo's ideological beliefs as well as his character preceding the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, thereby placing his approach to the war with Japan in the context of his larger understanding of modern global history and China's position in it. She points out that Chiang's conception of Japan had not progressed beyond the impressions he had gathered based on personal experience prior to 1927. He distinguished the Japanese people from their militarist leaders and held only the latter accountable for the invasion of China, a perspective that informed the "humanitarian bombardment" (as it was designated by Chiang) described above. Yet he held an exaggerated view of his influence on Japanese public opinion, along with misplaced faith in his Japanese "friends," such as pan-Asianist Tōyama Mitsuru and party politician Inukai Tsuyoshi.
Iechika suggests that one of Chiang's strategic objectives in the Sino-Japanese War was to align that conflict more closely with the Second World War: he wanted Japan to become embroiled in a catastrophic total war against the Allied Powers (100-104). Chiang had first hoped that the Soviets and Japanese would be drawn into a full-fledged war, but, Communists but also as a prefatory step toward a long-term anti-Japanese struggle (76-81).
Iechika makes it clear that Chiang, at least as much as the Communists, had a vision of modern nation-building for China that was fully integrated with the process of fighting against the Japanese invaders. Needless to say, her portrayal of the Nationalist leader is not always flattering. Aside from Chiang's almost self-delusionary belief in his power to shape public opinion in a foreign nation, he was unaware that his own closest aides, including his wife, Song Mei-ling, were blocking him from correctly assessing war situations. For example, when two bombs fell off Chinese planes and landed on Le Grand Monde and the Cathay Hotel in Shanghai, killing approximately 2,400 civilians, or when they blundered into attacking a U.S. battleship, Chiang was not made aware of these mistakes until months later (117) (118) (119) (120) (121) (122) (123) (124) (125) . His "scorched-earth" policy and decision to destroy the banks of the Yellow River in order to induce artificial floods are also subject to scathing criticism; hundreds of thousands of farmers lost their lives and millions more were rendered refugees as a result of the latter decision (177-180).
1 One cannot call this type of massive tragedy simply a strategic blunder or a "small sacrifice" needed to claim the ultimate victory; these and other "sacrifices" forced by Chiang on the Chinese people came back to haunt him as they were eventually used by the Communists to portray him as a heartless dictator unconcerned with the lives of ordinary people.
The scope of Iechika's book does not include Chiang's postwar defeat by the Communists, although she provides ample wartime data for us to draw our own conclusions as to where the blame for "losing" China might lie. Also relatively underemphasized in her account are the roles played by certain key figures, such as U.S. Army General Joseph Stilwell, in shaping Chiang's fortunes and ultimate reputation, as well as the question of how
Chiang eventually lost to the Communists precisely in the realm of propaganda and ideological campaigns that he was so focused on in the international theater. One must consult Taylor (2009 ), Mitter (2013 , and other works for these details. Nevertheless, Iechika's study is magisterial yet highly readable-one is almost tempted to say "entertaining," despite the scale of human tragedies described herein-and adds immense insight and information to our understanding of the Second Sino-Japanese War and modern East Asian history in general.
Intended for a more specialized readership than Iechika's study, The Historical Nakami begins his examination by deconstructing the Japanese conception of "Manchuria-Mongolia" as a regional category, which, based strictly on geopolitical calculations, has always been divorced from the way native Manchus and Mongolians saw their own territories (51-67). He shows that the "Eastern Inner Mongolia" that eventually fused with "Southern Manchuria" to form an object of so much obsession and preoccupation among Japanese policy makers and civilian activists was an entirely artificial "region" literally made up on the map, as it were, through a 1912 agreement with Russia.
Nakami then pieces together the exact relationship between Gungsangnorbu, on the one hand, and Kwashima Naniwa (1866-1949) and other Japanese "Asia hands" congregating in northeastern China, on the other. Based on Mongolian and Chinese sources Nakami argues that, while Gungsangnorbu was a forward-looking leader with a fairly good grasp of the need for modernizing reforms, he suffered from chronic financial problems and had virtually no military power of his own (89-102). Carefully sifting through the Japaneselanguage sources, Nakami finds little evidence that Japanese diplomats or even high-ranking military officers, such as Utsunomiya Tarō (1861 Tarō ( -1922 , an army general, and Taga Muneyuki (1872 Muneyuki ( -1935 , the Japanese military adviser to Yuan Shih-kai, concretely supported or even sympathized with the wild scheme of Mongolian princes setting up a pro-Japanese "kingdom" of their own against the backdrop of the Xinhai Revolution. Moreover, Gungsangnorbu and other Mongolian princes were approaching Russia to promote their interests, and this "pragmatic" orientation on their part was well known to Japanese diplomats like Consul Baron Ishūin Hikokichi (1864 Hikokichi ( -1924 and Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai (1865 Kōsai ( -1936 . Despite this skepticism, did the Japanese not offer weapons, bullets, and gunpowder to Gungsangnorbu and lend him money after all? Yes, but these were nothing more than acts of insurance in preparation for any future contingency. The Japanese Empire's view of the Mongol princes, Nakami argues, was more accurately represented in Baron Ishūin's scathing As far as I can see, Mongolian princes to begin with are a band of riffraff without any ideology or conviction of their own. Once mobilized they all call for a constitutional monarchy, and with one rebuke from Yuan Shih-kai, all hold their breaths.… What [Gungsangnorbu] and his ilk really want is to do whatever is convenient for them in any given moment. It is not difficult to imagine that if any threat or seduction were visited on them from the other side, they would immediately betray us. (144) Nakami makes sure we comprehend that these Japanese views are just as self-centered as those of the Mongols they derogate. He defends Gungsangnorbu against accusations of being an opportunist by demonstrating that, with such limited resources and lack of solidarity among the Mongol princes, there was little else he could do, other than keeping stronger forces from overwhelming his domain.
In the book's later chapters, Nakami discusses Babujab (alternately spelled Ministry, and civilian activists could all agree about and work on. Nakami suggests instead that many "continental adventurers" held on to "a variety of sometimes mutually contradictory schemes," and that the military and diplomats "join[ed] these schemes when it suited them, but when not, mercilessly threw them away" (253). According to Nakami, the one figure-possibly the only figure-who actually benefited from all these squabbles, scams, and hugger-mugger among the Japanese was the warlord Zhang Zuo-lin. Nakami concludes that it was not the mirage of the "Manchurian-Mongolian problem" and the frankly fantastic or ludicrous solutions thrown at it by the Japanese imperialists, but the real power commanded by Zhang in southern Manchuria that led to his assassination in 1928 by the Kwantung Army and, subsequently, to the Manchurian Incident. Although Nakami's and Iechika's studies deal with different regions, different topics, and even different eras of history, they are both exemplary works of transnational history as applied to modern East Asia. They strongly challenge limited and prejudiced perspectives of national histories, be they Chinese, Mongolian, or Japanese, drawing on multilingual primary sources from over all over the world, from Dairen to Ulaanbaatar to Stanford, and evince a strong awareness of global scholarly readership. Most importantly, they are truly "transnational" in the sense that they recover the agency of local actors-Chiang Kai-shek, Gungsangnorbu, Babujab-and cast those actors in the context of global relations of material exchange and discursive circulation. From Iechika's book, for instance, we learn not whether Chiang was a heroic leader, fit to be enshrined in the pantheon of Chinese and Taiwanese national histories, but more precious and useful information about the ways in which he shaped his military and diplomatic strategies in relation to the dynamics of world history. This does not excuse Chiang's many foibles and failings, but it certainly gives us a more complete portrait of him than one confined to the framework of national history. Her book exposure of the absence of a Japan-sponsored "Mongolian independence movement" does not lead to the exoneration of Japanese imperialism but, rather, to a more accurate and fully rounded understanding of its extent and limits in relation to the Asian continent. Rather than reading one more treatise espousing the theoretical imperatives of a transnational history, readers are recommended to take up the two books under discussion, which practice transnational history with care, precision, and conviction.
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Notes

1
Rana Mitter (2013, 164) estimates that there were three to five million refugees.
